

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 02861 01 OF 03 191808Z

47

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 EURE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04

H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 CEA-01 COME-00 EB-07 FRB-03

CIEP-01 STR-04 TRSE-00 LAB-04 SIL-01 SAM-01 OMB-01

FEAE-00 AF-06 IO-11 SCCT-01 /115 W

----- 027394

P R 191741Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6591

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 02861

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EEC, GW, FR

SUBJECT: FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT

REF: PARIS 04797 (NOTAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 02861 01 OF 03 191808Z

BEGIN SUMMARY: THE COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR FRENCH AFFAIRS IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE (DR. FEIT) HAS GIVEN US A RUNDOWN OF THE SUBJECTS ADDRESSED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS DURING THE FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT NEAR NICE ON FEBRUARY 12-13. IN ADDITION TO AMPLIFYING ON, AND PROVIDING A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT VIEWPOINT FROM, REFTEL, DR. FEIT NOTED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER HAD PROPOSED THAT THE EC PURSUE A DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL SIMILAR TO THE ONE WITH THE ARAB SITUATION. FRENCH REACTION WAS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC, BUT NOT COMPLETELY NEGATIVE EITHER. END SUMMARY.

1. GENERAL

DR. FEIT WAS PRESENT DURING THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUES AS WELL AS AT THE PLENARY SESSION. LIKE HIS FRENCH COUNTERPART (REFTEL), HE WAS NOT INFORMED ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THE SCHMIDT-GISCARD MEETING. ONLY THE TWO PRINCIPALS PARTICIPATED IN THOSE DISCUSSIONS: DR. FEIT SAID HE HIMSELF COULD ATTEST TO THIS, FOR ON ONE OCCASION WHEN HE OPENED A DOOR BY MISTAKE, HE INADVERTENTLY INTERRUPTED THE TWO LEADERS WHO WERE VERY MUCH ALONE IN THE ROOM.

DR. FEIT NOTED THAT MOST OF THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH TOOK PLACE BETWEEN THE OTHER MINISTERS WHO ACCOMPANIED THE CHANCELLOR AND THE PRESIDENT CONCERNED ECONOMIC SUBJECTS (SEE SEPARATE TEL). IN ADDITION TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, THE MAJOR GERMAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE WERE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR MAIHOFER, MINISTER OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY MATTHOEFER, MINISTER OF ECONOMICS FRIDERICH, MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE ERTL, MINISTER OF FINANCE APEL, THE COMMISSIONER FOR FRENCH-GERMAN COORDINATION CARLO SCHMID, AND OBERBURGERMEISTER SCHUETZ FROM BERLIN. IN ADDITION TO PRESIDENT GISCARD AND FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUES, THE MAJOR FRENCH PARTICIPANTS WERE PREMIER CHIRAC, MINISTERS OF STATE PONIATOWSKI (INTERIOR) AND LECANUET (JUSTICE), MINISTER OF ECONOMICS AND CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 02861 01 OF 03 191808Z

FINANCE FOURCADE, MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE BONNET, MINISTER OF INDUSTRY D'ORNANO, AND THE COMMISSIONER FOR FRENCH-GERMAN COORDINATION LAPIE.

2. EEC-ISRAEL

FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER HAD SUGGESTED TO FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUES THAT THE EC PURSUE A DIALOGUE

WITH ISRAEL SIMILAR TO THE DIALOGUE WITH THE ARABS NOW UNDERWAY. ACCORDING TO DR. FEIT, THIS WAS NOT A NEW IDEA BUT HAD BEEN FORESEEN IN THE ISRAELI-EC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT OF SOME TWO YEARS AGO. HOWEVER, NOTHING HAD YET BEEN DONE TO IMPLEMENT THAT PART OF THE AGREEMENT-- PRIMARILY BECAUSE ISRAEL HAD NOT TAKEN THE INITIATIVE TO DO SO (SEE IN THIS CONNECTION EC BRUSSELS 10374 OF 11/19/75). WHAT THE FRG HAD IN MIND WAS NOTHING SPEC-TACULAR: PERHAPS THE EC PRESIDENCY COULD ENGAGE IN A LOW KEY DIALOGUE WITH THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR ACCREDITED TO THE COUNTRY CURRENTLY HOLDING THE EC PRESIDENCY.

IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, DR. FEIT SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD NOT BEEN PARTICULARLY FORTHCOMING. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAD NOT REJECTED THE FRG SUGGESTION OUT OF HAND.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 02861 02 OF 03 191810Z

47

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 EURE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04

H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 CEA-01 COME-00 EB-07 FRB-03

CIEP-01 STR-04 TRSE-00 LAB-04 SIL-01 SAM-01 OMB-01

FEAE-00 AF-06 IO-11 SCCT-01 /115 W

----- 027411

P R 191741Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6592

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS  
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
USMISSION USBERLIN  
AMEMBASSY LISBON  
AMEMBASSY MADRID  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 02861

3. EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 02861 02 OF 03 191810Z

FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUES PUSHED THE IDEA THAT THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE SHOULD BE MADE MORE CONCRETE IN THE ECONOMIC AREA. BIGGER PROJECTS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ARAB OIL STATES SHOULD HELP PAY FOR A SHARE OF THESE LARGER PROJECTS' THE FRENCH POINT WAS TO INSURE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RADICAL ARAB STATES SEE THAT THE DIALOGUE HAS MEANING. DR. FEIT SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AGREED THAT THE DIALOGUE HAD TO BE MADE MORE SUBSTANTIVE IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD.

IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, DR. FEIT CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION ABOUT GIVING A POLITICAL CONTENT TO THE EURO-ARAB DIALOGUE. IN DOING SO, DR. FEIT CONTRADICTED THE FRENCH SOURCE OF THE PARIS REFTEL. DR. FEIT DID ADD, HOWEVER, THAT THIS QUESTION HAD BEEN THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED EARLIER. MOREOVER, PART OF THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THESE TWO SOURCES MAY BE MORE APPARENT THAN REAL, SINCE DR. FEIT'S BRIEFING DID NOT CONTRADICT THE IDEA THAT BY GIVING A GREATER ECONOMIC ASPECT TO THE DIALOGUE FRANCE HOPED TO BLUNT DEMANDS FOR GIVING THE DIALOGUE A POLITICAL CONTENT.

4. ANGOLA

FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUES PUSHED HARD FOR RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA. PRESIDENT BONGO OF THE GABON HAD VISITED PARIS THE DAY BEFORE THE FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT AND HAD URGED WESTERN RECOGNITION. SAUVAGNARGUES HAD TOLD GENSCHER THAT FRANCE WANTED TO RECOGNIZE THE MPLA WITHIN 48 HOURS.

GENSCHER HAD PROTESTED AGAINST SUCH A QUICK CHANGE IN POLICY. HE ASKED FOR TIME TO CONSULT WITH MODERATE AFRICAN STATES AND NOTED THAT THE WEST HAD GIVEN NO SIGNALS THAT A CHANGE OF POSITION WAS IN THE OFFING. IN ANY CASE, THE FRG COULD NOT CHANGE ITS STAND WITHIN 48 HOURS. AS A RESULT OF GENSCHER'S STRONG REACTION, THE FRENCH AGREED TO ASK THE LUXEMBOURG PRESIDENCY TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION WITH ALL MEMBERS OF THE EC. OF COURSE, THE FRENCH DID BREAK RANKS WITH THE EC AND RECOGNIZE THE MPLA. THEY DID SO, HOWEVER, AFTER THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 02861 02 OF 03 191810Z

PASSAGE OF THEIR SELF-IMPOSED 48-HOUR DEADLINE.

#### 5. SPAIN

DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING THE SPANISH RELATIONSHIP TO THE EC WERE LONG AND ACHIEVED NO CONCRETE RESULTS. BOTH FOREIGN MINISTERS DECIDED THAT THEY HAD TO AWAIT WORD AS TO WHAT THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD SAY IN BRUSSELS BEFORE DECIDING HOW TO PROCEED. FRANCE AND THE FRG DID AGREE TO MEET AGAIN ON THE SIXTEENTH TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE.

ACCORDING TO DR. FEIT, SPAINS' RELATIONS WITH NATO WERE NOT DISCUSSED BY THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS.

#### 6. PORTUGAL

THE DISCUSSION ABOUT PORTUGAL WAS SHORT. BOTH PARTIES AGREED THE SITUATION HAD BECOME A GREAT DEAL BETTER IN THAT COUNTRY. SAUVAGNARGUES SAID THAT FRANCE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE THE KIND OF BANK CREDIT WHICH THE FRG HAD RECENTLY EXTENDED. OTHER FORMS OF POSSIBLE FRENCH AID WERE NOT MENTIONED, NOR WAS THE SUBJECT OF ASSISTANCE FROM THE EC. MOST OF THE TIME WAS SPENT IN A REVIEW OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION.

#### 7. NEAR EAST RESOLUTION

FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUES HAD EXPLAINED WHY THE FRENCH HAD VOTED FOR THE ARAB RESOLUTION IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. SAUVAGNARGUES HAD CLAIMED THAT FRANCE DID NOT AGREE WITH PARTS OF THE RESOLUTION, BUT ITS GENERAL THRUST WAS CLOSE TO THE CLASSIC FRENCH POLICY IN THE NEAR EAST.

#### 8. TFAI, COMOROS AND EX-SPANISH SAHARA

FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUES EXPLAINED THE FRENCH  
POSITION CONCERNING DJIBOUTI AND THE COMOROS. APPAR-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BONN 02861 02 OF 03 191810Z

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 02861 03 OF 03 191809Z

47

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 EURE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04

H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 CEA-01 COME-00 EB-07 FRB-03

CIEP-01 STR-04 TRSE-00 LAB-04 SIL-01 SAM-01 OMB-01

FEAE-00 AF-06 IO-11 SCCT-01 /115 W

----- 027403

P R 191741Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6593

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 02861

ENTLY FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER ONLY LISTENED. THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER ALSO DISCUSSED THE CONFLICT OVER THE EX-SPANISH SAHARA. HE EXPRESSED FRENCH DIS-  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 02861 03 OF 03 191809Z

QUIET OVER THE FACT THAT ALGERIA HAD ACCUSED FRANCE OF SUPPORTING MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA IN THE DISPUTE. ACCORDING TO SAUVAGNARGUES, ALGERIAN FORCES HAD BEEN INCREASED FROM 55,000 TO 130,000 MEN IN THE AREA ALONG THE BORDER. SOVIET EXPERTS WERE WITH THESE FORCES AS WELL AS SOVIET WAR MATERIAL ORIGINALLY DESTINED FOR ANGOLA.

#### 9. LEBANON

FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUES NOTED THAT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON APPEARED SOMEWHAT BETTER THAN IT HAD BEEN. SYRIA HAD OBTAINED A STRONG INFLUENCE. THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER SUGGESTED THAT EUROPE SHOULD DO SOMETHING FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LEBANON. HE WAS NOT PRECISE, BUT DID INDICATE THAT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MIGHT BE LOOKED AT FIRST.

#### 10. TERRORISM

FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER BROUGHT UP ONE OF HIS FAVORITE SUBJECTS: THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM. HE SAID IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ITS EUROPEAN CONTEXT, IN THE FRENCH-GERMAN CONTEXT AND IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT. SAUVAGNARGUES WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER THE SUBJECT IN THE FIRST TWO AREAS, BUT EXPRESSED UNEASE AT DISCUSSING IT IN INTERNATIONAL FORA LIKE THE UN. THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER FELT THAT ANY WESTERN INITIATIVE THERE COULD BE PERVERTED BY THIRD WORLD RADICALS.

IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, DR. FEIT SAID THAT NO DECISIONS ON THIS SUBJECT HAD BEEN MADE. THE FRG HAD EXPECTED NONE, FOR IT FELT THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY FOR ANY TO BE MADE. THIS WAS MERELY ANOTHER STEP IN THE FRG'S CAMPAIGN TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN THIS FIELD.

#### 11. FRENCH-GDR CONSULAR NEGOTIATIONS

PLEADING IGNORANCE OF THE INTRICACIES OF THE QUESTION,  
DR. FEIT DID NOT GO INTO GREAT DETAIL CONCERNING THE  
FRENCH GDR CONSULAR NEGOTIATIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 02861 03 OF 03 191809Z

## 12. SECURITY ISSUES

ACCORDING TO DR. FEIT, THE FOREIGN MINISTER DID NOT  
DISCUSS ANY SECURITY ISSUES.

## 13. ATMOSPHERICS AND CONCLUSION

DR. FEIT CLAIMED THAT THE ATMOSPHERE THROUGHOUT THE  
DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN GOOD. ONLY ONE CONTENTIOUS ISSUE  
HAD ARisen: ANGOLA. THE FRG WAS QUITE CONTENT WITH  
THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING.

HILLENBRAND

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptoning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** SUMMIT MEETINGS, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 19 FEB 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976BONN02861  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D760062-0927  
**From:** BONN  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t19760236/aaaabfgx.tel  
**Line Count:** 408  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 8  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 76 PARIS 4797  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 30 MAR 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <30 MAR 2004 by greeneet>; APPROVED <31 MAR 2004 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT  
**TAGS:** PFOR, GE, FR, EEC, (SAUVAGNARGUES, JEAN), (GENSCHER, HANS DIETRICH)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006